The International Energy Agency (IEA), an autonomous agency, was established in November 1974. Its primary mandate was -and is -two-fold: to promote energy security amongst its member countries through collective response to physical disruptions in oil supply, and provide authoritative research and analysis on ways to ensure reliable, affordable and clean energy for its 28 member countries and beyond. The IEA carries out a comprehensive programme of energy co-operation among its member countries, each of which is obliged to hold oil stocks equivalent to 90 days of its net imports. The Agency's aims include the following objectives:  Secure member countries' access to reliable and ample supplies of all forms of energy; in particular, through maintaining effective emergency response capabilities in case of oil supply disruptions.  Promote sustainable energy policies that spur economic growth and environmental protection in a global context -particularly in terms of reducing greenhouse-gas emissions that contribute to climate change.  Improve transparency of international markets through collection and analysis of energy data.  Support global collaboration on energy technology to secure future energy supplies and mitigate their environmental impact, including through improved energy effi ciency and development and deployment of low-carbon technologies.  Find solutions to global energy challenges through engagement and dialogue with non-member countries, industry, international organisations and other stakeholders. The IEA Model of Short-term Energy Security (MOSES) 
Overview
Ensuring energy security has been at the centre of the IEA mission since its inception. Founded in response to the oil crisis of 1973, the IEA initially focused on oil supply security. While the security of oil supplies remains important, contemporary energy security policies must address all energy sources and cover a comprehensive range of natural, economic and political risks that affect different energy sources, infrastructures and services. Due to this greater complexity, rigorous and comprehensive analysis of national energy security is increasingly important for informing energy policies.
In response to this challenge, the IEA is currently developing a Model of Short-Term Energy Security (MOSES), which evaluates and compares the energy security of IEA countries. MOSES does not rank countries from most to least secure; it defines countries' energy security profiles and groups countries with similar combinations of risks and resilience factors. This evaluation is based on a set of quantitative indicators that reflect both the risks of energy supply disruptions and an energy system's resilience, or ability to cope with such disruptions.
MOSES has been used to analyse security of supply of seven primary energy sources (crude oil, natural gas, coal, bioenergy and waste, hydropower, geothermal energy, & nuclear power) and two groups of secondary fuels (oil products and biofuels). The IEA is in the process of extending the analysis to electricity and end uses, which will be reflected in subsequent versions of MOSES.
MOSES involves a novel approach which combines indicators of energy security in a systematic, transparent and policy-relevant way. It highlights vulnerabilities of energy systems in IEA countries and can be used to track the evolution of a country's energy security profile. Policy makers and analysts can use MOSES to identify energy policy priorities by assessing the effects of different policies on a country's energy security. MOSES can serve as a starting point for studies of national energy security by providing a systematic, generic assessment framework that can be complemented by nationally relevant indicators and considerations. MOSES also allows for comparison of national energy security challenges in order to identify common strategies and responses and facilitate exchanges of information and policy experience among countries.
This paper provides a detailed description of MOSES. It first explains the general principles, the framework of analysis and lists the indicators used. The following sections describe the process and results of evaluating security of supply for seven primary energy sources and two secondary fuels. Each section devoted to an energy source or fuel starts by presenting indicators and the bands used for classifying risks and resilience capacities as high, medium and low. It then describes how the indicators are combined, and presents the resulting classification of IEA countries according to their energy security profiles related to these fuels. Readers interested in a short overview of MOSES are invited to read the brochure Measuring short-term energy security.
General model description Background
Historically, energy security was primarily associated with oil supply. While oil supply remains a key issue, the increasing complexity of energy systems requires systematic and rigorous understanding of a wider range of vulnerabilities. Disruptions can affect other fuel sources (e.g. droughts causing a drop in hydroelectricity availability), infrastructure (e.g. technical failures affecting pipelines or power plants), or end-use sectors (e.g. sudden surges in demand for heat or electricity during extreme weather events). Thus, analysis of a country's oil import dependency, suppliers and emergency stocks is no longer sufficient for understanding its energy security situation.
The IEA has responded to this challenge by developing a comprehensive perspective on energy security that extends beyond oil to monitor and analyse all aspects of the energy system. This paper presents a tool designed by the IEA to analyse short-term energy security of its member countries. The IEA Model of Short-term Energy Security (MOSES) aims to help IEA countries understand their energy security profiles in order to identify energy policy priorities.
Scope and purpose
MOSES focuses on short-term energy security: vulnerability to physical disruptions that can last for days or weeks. Taking an energy systems approach, described in the next section, MOSES identifies a set of indicators for external risks (from energy imports) and for domestic risks (from transformation and distribution) as well as for resilience -a country's capacity to deal with different types of disruptions.
The first version of MOSES (Primary Energy Sources and Secondary Fuels) presented in this paper covers seven primary sources (crude oil, natural gas, coal, biomass and waste, hydropower, geothermal energy and nuclear power) and two sets of secondary fuels (oil products and liquid biofuels). The IEA is working to extend the analysis to power generation and end-uses of energy, which will be reflected in subsequent versions of MOSES.
MOSES highlights vulnerabilities of energy systems and can be used to track the evolution of a country's energy security profile. Policy makers and analysts can use MOSES to identify energy policy priorities by assessing the effects of different policies on a country's energy security. MOSES can serve as a starting point for studies of national energy security by providing a systematic, generic assessment framework that can be complemented by nationally relevant indicators and considerations. MOSES also allows for international comparison and interpretation of national energy security challenges in order to identify common strategies and responses and facilitate exchanges of information and policy experience among countries. The overall purpose of MOSES is to provide a basis for understanding the broader energy security landscape for IEA countries.
Energy systems approach
MOSES takes an energy systems approach, dealing with all parts of the energy system from supply to transformation, distribution and end-use energy services. For energy security, this means understanding how vulnerabilities of different parts of the system may affect energy services. In its current version, MOSES starts by analysing vulnerabilities of primary energy sources and assessing how these affect the security of secondary fuels. This version also lays the groundwork for extending the analysis to security of electricity and end-use sectors. Note: This paper only discusses primary sources and two groups of secondary fuels (solid in figure) . Analysis of power generation, electricity and end-uses is still under development.
Figure 1 Energy systems approach
By helping policy makers identify and understand strengths and weaknesses of a particular energy system, this systematic approach can be used to formulate strategies and policies for decreasing vulnerabilities and increasing resilience, targeting different elements of energy systems or their interconnections.
Framework of analysis: dimensions of energy security
The first step in designing MOSES was to identify the key dimensions of short-term energy security. There are dozens of scientific and professional publications proposing approaches to measuring energy security with different goals, assumptions, definitions of energy security and conceptual frameworks 1 . These approaches also vary in the way they identify temporal, sectoral and spatial boundaries of energy systems. While MOSES builds on the available scholarly and policy literature (Box 1), it does not strictly follow any existing approach. MOSES' novel framework responds to specific energy security concerns of IEA countries and is designed to offer policy-relevant insights into both the risks of short-tem disruptions of energy systems and their resilience to such disruptions.
Box 1 MOSES in the context of existing energy security studies
Recent literature on energy security focuses on defining energy security and delineating its dimensions (Sovacool and Brown, 2010; Cherp and Jewell, 2011; Jansen and Seebregts 2009; Stirling 2010) , and on metrics, indicators and quantification methodologies (APERC, 2007; Gupta, 2008; Jansen, Arkel and Boots, 2004; Kendell, 1998; Scheepers, Seebregts, de Jong, and Maters, 2007; Stirling, 1994) . The literature is summarised in several recent meta-surveys (Cherp and Jewell, 2010, 2011; Kruyt, Vuuren, Vries, and Groenenberg, 2009; Sovacool and Brown, 2010) .
One way of defining energy security is by delineating different types of risks, often including longerterm aspects. A commonly cited approach is the four As of energy security (APERC, 2007; Kruyt et al., 2009) -availability (geological) , accessibility (geopolitical), affordability (economic) and acceptability (environmental and social) -which includes concerns related to long-term depletion of fossil-fuel reserves and environmental aspects of energy security. A recent study by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce (2010) resembles this approach, presenting four dimensions of energy security: geopolitical (energy imports, particularly from politically unstable regions), economic (high energy intensity and trade imbalances), reliability (adequacy and reliability of infrastructure) and environmental (related to the carbon intensity of the energy system). While this approach is comprehensive, it does not lend itself well to a disaggregated energy system analysis because indicators often overlap in multiple dimensions and it lacks transparency in how it aggregates indicators to arrive at its index. Nor do these risk-focused approaches cover such key factors as the resilience of energy systems.
Definitions of energy security often emphasise the economic cost and physical availability of energy (e.g. Bohi and Toman, 1996, Kendell 1998; Gupta 2008 ). This echoes the IEA's own definition of energy security as "the uninterrupted physical availability at a price which is affordable, while respecting environmental concerns". However, the distinction between physical and economic concerns has been criticised on conceptual grounds (Keppler 2007) . Environmental concerns are usually treated by policy makers as constraints rather than primary goals of energy security. While these concerns are important, they lie outside of the scope of MOSES, which focuses on short-term physical disruptions of energy supply.
The approaches closest to MOSES include one of the most prominent and widely cited studies on measuring energy security, which resulted in the Supply and Demand Index and the Crisis Capability Index (Scheepers, Seebregts, de Jong & Maters, 2007) as well as Cherp and Jewell's recently published framework on the benefits of disaggregated energy system analysis for energy security concerns (2010) . Another recent approach that inspired MOSES is the energy security assessment framework in the Global Energy Assessment (Cherp et al., In press) , further elaborated in Cherp and Jewell (2011) , which considers three aspects of energy security: robustness (adequacy and reliability of resources and infrastructure), sovereignty (exposure to threats from foreign actors) and resilience (ability to respond to diverse disruptions).
MOSES resembles recent approaches in considering risks and resilience related to imported and domestic sources. While many other studies focus on long-term energy security (Jansen 2004 , Scheepers et al., 2007 Cherp et al., 2011) , MOSES deals with short-term energy security (days to weeks), excluding indicators that are only relevant to the long-term perspective, such as environmental impact, rapid growth in demand and depletion of natural resources. By focusing on physical disruptions, MOSES also excludes economic issues related to affordability and volatility of energy prices.
MOSES addresses four dimensions of energy security (Table 1) . These include external factors related to imported energy and domestic factors related to production, transformation and distribution of energy within national borders. External and domestic factors analysed in MOSES reflect both risk exposure and resilience, the ability of energy systems to adapt to or withstand disruptions. 
Identifying indicators
MOSES analyses the four dimensions of energy security using 35 indicators (Table 2 ), chosen to signal the level of risk or adequacy of resilience for different energy sources and fuels in national energy systems. Each indicator relates to at least one of the four dimensions of energy security.
Indicators used in MOSES (Table 2 ) -from one to seven for each fuel or source -were identified based on existing academic and professional literature and through expert consultations within the IEA. Most indicators are available in time-series with regular updates. The sources of data used in MOSES include the IEA and the OECD, the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA), the World Bank, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and Gas Infrastructure Europe (GIE).
Unfortunately, many indicators suggested during IEA expert consultations could not be used because the data are not available in a comparable form for all IEA countries. For crude oil and oil products, for example, it was suggested that the "network quality" of oil transport be measured. However, no objectively measurable indicator or index was identified across all IEA countries. 
Combining and interpreting indicators
While indicators can provide insights into the state of an energy system, looking at dozens of them can quickly lead to information overload and confuse rather than facilitate decision-making. Thus a key step in working with indicators is combining and interpreting them in a way that is transparent, logical and relevant to policy.
In MOSES, indicators are aggregated in two steps. First, three bands of values -corresponding to low, medium and high vulnerability -are established for each indicator. These bands are primarily based on the observed ranges of the indicator values in IEA countries. For example, crude oil import dependencies in IEA countries naturally fall into three categories: low (≤15%) import dependency and net-exporters, moderate import dependency (40%-65%), and high import dependency (≥80%). In some cases, expert judgements are used to determine the 'safe' levels of risks or 'adequate' resilience capacities. For example for crude oil, having 5 or more ports capable of receiving oil imports or 9 or more pipelines was considered as 'high' level of resilience.
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In the second step, this categorisation is used to establish an energy security profile for each country, by combining indicators in a way that takes into account how particular risks may exacerbate one another and how particular resilience capacities may mitigate specific risks. For example, the number of ports or pipelines mitigates risks of imports, but is not relevant for countries whose production is primarily domestic. In contrast, fuel storage is considered a resilience factor for risks related to both domestically sourced and imported fuels, since it mitigates risks from both sources.
Countries are then grouped in three to five energy security profiles for each energy source or fuel, based on their overall risk exposure and resilience capacities ( Figure 2 ). This process clusters countries with similar risk/resilience profiles. The energy security profiles are marked by letters A to E, moving from lower risk/higher resilience profiles (higher energy security) to higher risk/lower resilience profiles (lower energy security). Details of this clustering are presented for each energy source or fuel in the following section.
Figure 2 Energy security profiles

Limitations and future work
Any study of energy security faces a series of choices and MOSES is no exception. The focus on short-term physical security of primary sources and secondary fuels excludes notions that are more relevant in medium-or long-term perspectives on energy security, such as the environmental impact of energy systems, rapidly growing demand for energy services and the depletion of natural resources. Aspects related to the "economic" or "affordability" dimension of energy security, such as the level and volatility of energy prices, are also excluded.
The security of an energy system is not limited to the state of its infrastructure (the primary focus of MOSES), but also to the effectiveness of its policies and regulations as well as the market structure and the investment climate. While governance, institutional and investment factors can be important for energy security, they are not easily quantified and thus only indirectly reflected in MOSES.
Additionally, MOSES deals exclusively with national indicators. While certain energy markets operate regionally (e.g. the European Union) or sub-nationally (e.g. Australia's regional gas markets), MOSES does not take these situations into account because it primarily focuses on infrastructure.
MOSES aims to evaluate security of supply of individual sources and fuels. It is not designed to compare security of supply across different energy sources, nor to produce an overall "energy security index" spanning several fuels and carriers. Consequently, it cannot be used to compare the "overall" energy security of countries, although the situation with respect to specific sources and fuels can easily be compared. Since this version of MOSES focuses on security of supply of primary energy and secondary fuels, it does not deal with security of solar, wind, and ocean energy which cannot be analysed separately from security of electricity systems.
While security of supply is important, ultimately consumers and policy makers are most concerned about the security of energy services, so incorporating electricity and end uses into MOSES will be key steps in providing policy-relevant analysis of energy security.
Evaluation of individual sources and fuels
This section presents an evaluation of the short-term energy security of seven primary energy sources and two sets of secondary fuels. For each source and fuel, the section presents:
(1) indicators;
(2) the assessment process; and (3) consolidated results for IEA countries.
Crude oil
Indicators: crude oil
The analysis of crude oil vulnerability is based on eight indicators (Table 3) with ranges of values corresponding to high, medium and low levels of risk and resilience (Table 4) . • import dependence
• political stability of suppliers
External resilience:
• number of ports
• number of pipelines
• diversity of suppliers
Domestic Domestic risks:
• share of offshore production
• volatility of domestic production Domestic resilience:
• average storage level
The most important indicator in terms of crude oil supply security is net import dependence. IEA countries 3 naturally fall into three categories: low import dependency (≤15%) and net exporters; medium import dependency (40%-65%) and high import dependency (≥80%). A related external risk indicator is the political stability of supplying countries. This is calculated by taking a weighted average of the political stability of suppliers based on the proportion of crude oil imported from each supplier and the OECD political stability rating of that supplier. The OECD political stability rating ranges from 0 to 7, with OECD countries rated 0 and the most politically unstable countries rated 7. This indicator ranges from 0.4 to 5.1 in IEA countries.
External resilience indicators for crude oil include the number and type of entry points for imports and the diversity of suppliers. Crude oil can enter a country by maritime ports or pipelines. 4 The more entry points a country has, the less vulnerable it is to supply disruptions. Ports are valued higher than pipelines, as they can be used to receive crude from a larger number of suppliers. Five ranges for this indicator were established:
 lowest: only one import pipeline (no ports);  low: only 1 port and/or 2 pipelines;  medium: 2 ports or 3-4 pipelines;  medium-high: 3-4 ports or 5-8 pipelines; and  high: at least 5 ports or 9 pipelines.
The diversity of suppliers is calculated using the Herfindahl-Hirschman index, which is a measure of the concentration of supply. This index ranges from 0.1 (for high diversity) to 1.0 (for no diversity of supply). Three ranges of values for this indicator were established: high diversity of suppliers (<0.3), moderate diversity of suppliers (0.3-0.8) and low diversity of suppliers (>0.8).
The indicator for domestic resilience of crude oil supply is the average level of crude oil storage in 2010, divided by the maximum refinery intake in 2010. Three ranges of this indicator were established: low (≤15 days), moderate (between 20 and 50 days) and high (≥55 days).
Finally, for countries with significant domestic production of crude oil, internal risks are evaluated using two indicators: the share of offshore production and the volatility of domestic production. The ranges for the share of offshore production are low (<15%) and high (>90%). The ranges for the volatility of production, calculated by dividing the standard deviation of the monthly crude oil production in a given year by the average monthly crude oil production, are low (<20%) and high (>20%). 
Assessment process: crude oil
Countries are assigned to five groups with different crude oil security profiles (Figure 3 ). At each step of the process, countries are sorted into categories according to one of the indicators described in the previous section. The resulting crude oil security profiles reflect unique combinations of risk and resilience (Table 6 ).
In the first step, countries are grouped according to their crude oil import dependency. Countries with low import dependency are assigned to Group A. Countries with medium import dependency are assigned to Group B. Risk factors associated with domestic production are further analysed for countries in these categories (for intra-group sorting without affecting their grouping).
In the second step, external and domestic resilience factors are analysed for countries with high crude oil import dependence. First, import infrastructure (the number and type of entry points) and the diversity of suppliers are analysed to determine the overall external resilience of a country (Table 5) . Countries with high external resilience fall into Groups B and C, countries with moderate external resilience fall into Groups C and D, and countries with low external resilience fall into Groups D and E. The crude oil storage level is used as a differentiating factor for the final allocation of the highly import-dependent countries ( Figure 5 ) between groups B and C (high vs. medium storage); C and D (high-medium vs. low storage); as well as D and E (high-medium vs. low and high vs. medium).
As the result of this second step, countries with the highest external and domestic resilience are assigned to Group B (the same as moderately import-dependent countries). The remaining countries are divided among groups C, D and E depending on their resilience capacities ( Figure 5 ).
MOSES further refines this evaluation by considering group-specific factors such as:
 crude oil storage levels, volatility of domestic production and the share of offshore production for net exporters and nearly self-sufficient countries in Group A;
 the volatility of domestic production, the share of offshore oil production, importing infrastructure and the diversity of suppliers for moderately import-dependent countries in Group B; and  the political stability of suppliers for highly import-dependent countries in Groups B, C, D and E. 
Results: crude oil
4
C Import ≥80% of their crude oil consumption and have:  ≥5 crude oil ports, high supplier diversity, and <50 days of crude oil storage or  2-4 crude oil ports, high supplier diversity and >20 days of crude oil storage.
9
D Import ≥80% of their crude oil consumption and have:  2-4 crude oil ports, high supplier diversity, and ≤15 days of crude oil storage or  2 crude oil ports or 3 crude oil pipelines, low supplier diversity, and ≥15 days crude oil storage or  1-2 crude oil pipelines or 1 crude oil port and have either:
 medium to high supplier diversity and ≥15 days of crude oil storage or  low supplier diversity and ≥55 days of crude oil storage.
6
E Import ≥80% of their crude oil consumption and have:  1-3 crude oil pipelines or 1 crude oil port and ≤15 days of crude oil storage or  1-2 crude oil pipelines, low supplier diversity and <50 days of crude oil storage.
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Note: this table includes 27 countries because Luxembourg does not use crude oil.
Oil products
Oil products consumed can either be refined domestically (12 IEA countries refine virtually all their consumption needs) or imported. Each of these two supply streams is associated with specific risks and resilience factors. While imported products can be subject to disruption of trade, supply routes or compromised importing infrastructure, domestically refined products are exposed to the risks of refinery outages and disruptions of adequate crude supply.
The analysis in this section is conducted separately for middle distillates, motor gasoline and other oil products.
The middle distillates group includes: gas/diesel oil, kerosene-type jet fuel, and other kerosene. It accounted for between 24% and 84% of demand in IEA countries in 2010, while motor gasoline accounted for 5% to 45% of demand.
Other oil products is a diverse category that includes: fuel oil, refinery gas, ethane, naphtha, aviation gasoline, gasoline type jet fuel, petroleum coke, white spirit, lubricants, bitumen, paraffin waxes, and all other products. The vast majority of these products are used in small quantities (<5% of oil product demand) for most IEA countries. The most notable exception is naphtha, which accounts for 40% of oil product demand in Korea (primarily in the petrochemical industry) and 10% to 20% in seven other IEA countries. Another notable exception is fuel oil, which accounts for 10% to 30% of oil product demand in 10 IEA countries. Fuel oil can be easily substituted with crude oil, distillates or, in the case of power generation, natural gas. Naphtha was not analysed because it is used primarily in the petrochemical industry, not as an energy source but rather as an input resource. Detailed analysis of naphtha was deemed to be beyond the scope of this paper, which is designed to be a high-level tool for identifying key vulnerabilities in IEA countries. One key assumption in this aggregated analysis is that if an IEA country has one dominant "other oil product", the days of stock cover and product balance will primarily reflect the dominant product.
Indicators: oil products
The analysis for oil product vulnerability is based on nine indicators for each oil product category. Seven of these indicators are the same for all three categories and two are specific to each subcategory (Table 7) . Exposure to external risks is evaluated using deficits, i.e. the proportion of domestically consumed oil product that is imported. Separate indicators for each oil product category are used instead of the aggregate oil product import dependency, because while some countries are not net importers for total oil products, they are net importers for motor gasoline, middle distillates or other oil products. Since different categories of oil products are not interchangeable in most situations the analysis is done separately for each product category. Four ranges of values for oil product import dependency are used: lowest (<5%), low (5%-25%), medium (25%-45%) and high (>45%) fuel deficit.
External risks are mitigated by external resilience factors reflected in the number and type of entry points and the diversity of suppliers. The ranges for the diversity of suppliers indicators for oil products differ from those for crude oil and natural gas because of the differences between international markets for these fuels. While the crude oil and natural gas markets can only be supplied by countries with oil/gas deposits, the oil products market can be supplied by a much larger number of countries with refineries. Thus, more stringent ranges of supplier diversity were used: high (≤0.18), medium (between 0.18 and 0.54) and low (≥0.54). 5 The ranges for entry points (Table 8 ) are similar to those used for evaluating crude oil security of supply.
In line with MOSES' energy systems approach to energy security, the evaluation of oil product security takes into account the vulnerability of crude oil supply. The five groups of crude oil supply vulnerability described in the previous section form the five natural ranges for this indicator.
The internal resilience indicators for oil products are the number of refineries, the flexibility of the refining infrastructure (i.e. the ability of refineries to deal with different kinds of crude oil calculated using the Nelson complexity index 6 ) and the storage levels for respective oil products measured as the average number of weeks of forward demand (consumption) stored. The ranges for these indicators are presented in Table 8 .
Political stability of suppliers was discarded as a discriminating indicator after detailed analysis. In general, the political stability of suppliers of oil products to IEA countries is high (weighted average generally less than 2 on a scale of 0 to 7, with 0 representing OECD countries and 7 the most politically unstable countries). 
Assessment process: oil products
The analysis of oil product supply security is conducted in a four step process (Figure 4 ).
Step 1 evaluates the vulnerability of domestically refined products (based on refinery complexity and security of crude supply).
Step 2 evaluates the vulnerability of imported oil products based on external resilience and dependence on imported middle distillates, motor gasoline and other oil products.
Step 3 analyses the vulnerability of the combined oil product flow by combining the results from the first two steps.
Step 4 evaluates the vulnerability of the total oil product supply by combining the combined oil product flow analysis with the product stock levels, which is a resilience measure that can mitigate all types of risk arising from the oil product supply chain.
Figure 4
Oil Products: steps for assessing security of supply
Step 1: evaluation of vulnerability of domestically refined oil products.
The vulnerability of domestically refined oil products is evaluated in two stages. The first stage identifies five groups of countries based on their crude oil supply security and the flexibility of the refining infrastructure (Table 9 ).
7 Table 9 Oil products: vulnerability from crude oil supply and refinery flexibility 
Low (≤6) DK, NO TK
Note: Refinery flexibility is measured using the Nelson complexity index.
In the second stage, the number of refineries is taken into account. While the number of refineries depends on a country's size, having a single refinery makes a country particularly vulnerable to natural or technical failures. The results of this analysis are five groups of countries according to the vulnerability of domestically refined products (Table 10) .
Table 10
Oil products: vulnerability for domestically refined products 7 Luxembourg has no refinery, so is not included here.
Oil product vulnerability from crude oil supply and refinery flexibility (Table 9) Number of refineries
2+ refineries Only 1 refinery
Step 2: evaluation of vulnerability of imported oil products.
This step is only relevant for the 24 IEA countries with a trade deficit in at least one of the categories of oil products. First, the nature and number of entry points is combined with the supplier diversity to divide the countries into three groups (Table 11) . 
Low
IE LU
Note: External resilience is only evaluated for countries with net import dependency in at least one of the oil product groups.
Subsequently, the results of this evaluation are combined with the external risk exposure as represented by the deficit level. This is done independently for gasoline, middle distillates and other oil products (Tables 12a, 12b and 12c). external and internal vulnerabilities arising at different stages of the supply chain. Countries with more than six weeks of stock levels are assigned to Groups A and B. Countries with the "highest" security of oil product flow (Tables 13a, 13b and 13c) are also assigned to Groups A or B. 
Results: oil products
B 1
Import ≤45% of their gasoline consumption and are  in Crude oil groups A or B with <6 weeks of gasoline stocks or  in Crude oil group C with a moderate to highly flexible refining portfolio and 3-6 weeks of gasoline stocks.
B 2
Import ≤45% of their gasoline consumption and are  in Crude oil groups D or E with one highly flexible refinery and ≥9 weeks of gasoline stocks or Import >45% of their gasoline consumption and have  a moderate supplier diversity and ≥9 weeks of gasoline stocks.
5
C Import >45% of their gasoline consumption and have  6-9 weeks of gasoline stocks and either ≥6 sea ports for gasoline imports with low supplier diversity or 1-2 oil product pipelines with moderate supplier diversity.
D
Import >45% of their gasoline consumption and have  3-6 weeks of gasoline stocks, one oil product pipeline, and low supplier diversity. 
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B 1
Import ≤45% of their middle distillates consumption and  are in Crude oil groups A through C with ≥3 weeks of middle distillates stocks or
B 2
Import ≤45% of their middle distillates consumption and  are in Crude oil groups D or E with a moderate to highly flexible refining portfolio and ≥6 weeks of middle distillates stocks or Import >45% of their middle distillates consumption with ≥9 weeks of middle distillates stocks and either moderate supplier diversity or ≥5 oil products ports.
5
C Import ≤45% of their middle distillates consumption and in Crude oil group E with 1 highly flexible refinery and ≥6 weeks of middle distillates stocks.
D
Import >45% of their middle distillates consumption with moderate supplier diversity and 3-6 weeks of middle distillates stocks.
E
Import 100% of their middle distillates consumption through 1 pipeline with low supplier diversity and ≤3 weeks of middle distillates stocks.
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Table 14c
Oil products: other oil products security profiles
Group
Countries that: No. of countries A Import ≤45% of their other oil products consumption and are  in Crude oil groups A or B with ≥6 weeks of other oil products stocks or  in Crude oil group C with either  a highly flexible refining portfolio and ≥6 weeks other oil products stocks or  a limited to moderately flexible refining portfolio with ≥ 9 weeks of other oil products stocks.
B
Import ≤45% of their other oil products consumption and are  in Crude oil groups A or B with <6 weeks of other oil products stocks or  in Crude oil group C with moderate flexibility of refining and 3-9 weeks of other oil products stocks.
C 1
Import ≤45% of their other oil products consumption and are  in Crude oil group C with either:  a moderately to highly flexible refining portfolio and <3 weeks of other oil products stocks or  a relatively inflexible refining portfolio with ≥3 weeks of other oil products stocks or  in Crude oil group D with a highly flexible refining portfolio and at least 2 refineries.
C 2
Import >45% of their other oil products consumption with ≥5 oil product ports and ≥6 weeks of other oil products stocks.
D
Import ≤45% of their other oil products consumption and are  in Crude oil groups D or E with either  a moderately flexible refining portfolio and 3-6 weeks of other oil products stocks or  a highly flexible refining portfolio and <3 weeks of other oil products stocks or Import >45% of their other oil products consumption with moderate supplier diversity and <3 weeks of other oil products stocks.
6
E Import 100% of their other oil products consumption with low supplier diversity and <3 weeks of other oil products stocks.
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Natural gas
The indicators and the assessment process for natural gas are very similar to those for crude oil.
Indicators: natural gas
The analysis of natural gas security includes seven indicators related to external and domestic aspects that reflect both risks and resilience capacity (Table 15 , with ranges in Table 16 ). • offshore production
Domestic resilience:
• send-out capacity from natural gas storage • gas intensity
As with crude oil, the most important indicator in terms of natural gas supply security is net import dependence. Countries fall into three categories: low import dependency (≤10%) and net exporters; moderate import dependency (30%-40%); and high import dependency (≥70%).
The political stability of supplying countries is also considered. This is calculated by taking the weighted average of supplying countries using the OECD political stability rating. This indicator ranges from 0.4 to 4.4 for IEA countries.
External resilience indicators include the number and type entry points and diversity of suppliers. Natural gas can be imported through liquefied natural gas (LNG) ports and pipelines. The more entry points a country has, the less vulnerable it is to supply disruptions. LNG ports offer greater resilience than pipelines because they can receive imports from the spot LNG market while pipelines generally can only receive imports from predetermined suppliers.
The diversity of suppliers is calculated using the Herfindahl-Hirschman index. This indicator is broken into three ranges: high diversity (<0.3), moderate diversity (0.3-0.6) and low diversity (>0.6). Domestic resilience is evaluated using daily send-out capacity from natural gas storage, measured by dividing the maximum drawdown rate from both underground and LNG storage by the peak daily demand. Countries can be separated into three groups: those that have a low send-out capacity compared with their peak daily demand (<50%), those that have moderate send-out capacity (between 50% and 100%) and those that have a high send-out capacity (>100%).
Natural gas intensity is also used as an indicator of domestic resilience. This is calculated by dividing a country's gas consumption by the GDP and is a sign of a country's economic exposure to gas disruptions.
Finally, for countries with significant domestic production capacities, domestic risks are evaluated using the share of offshore gas production. Countries are divided into two groups: high (≥80%) and low (≤30%). Offshore production is more vulnerable than onshore production. 
Domestic resilience
Send-out capacity <50% 50%-100% >100% Natural gas intensity, bcm/$1000 USD <20 20-60 >60
Assessment process: natural gas Natural gas security is evaluated in a step-by-step process ( Figure 5 ). At each step, countries are compared with respect to one indicator and then sorted into different categories (Table 16 ). They are then grouped according to their overall risk exposure and resilience capacity (Table 20) .
The first step in assessing natural gas security is to group countries by net import dependency. Seven countries with low import dependency (≤10%) and net exporters are assigned to Group A. External resilience factors are less relevant for the countries in this group because they do not rely heavily on imported natural gas. The United Kingdom is also assigned to Group A; it imports 40% of its gas from politically stable countries and has a highly developed import infrastructure. (Table 17 ) and diversity of suppliers (Table 18) . The countries with the highest external resilience and high or medium send-out capacity are assigned to Group B. The countries with the lowest external resilience and low send-out capacity are assigned to Group E. The remaining countries are assigned to Group D if either external resilience or send-out capacity is low. Countries with moderate resilience capacities are assigned to Group C.
 offshore production for net exporters in Group A;
 political stability of suppliers for countries in Groups B, C, D and E; and  send-out capacity and gas intensity for all countries. 
Results: natural gas
A
Export natural gas or Import ≤10% of their natural gas supply or Import 10%-40% with ≥5 pipelines, ≥3 LNG ports, and a high supplier diversity.
B
Import ≥70% of their natural gas supply and have  ≥5 pipelines and/or ≥3 LNG ports, a high supplier diversity, and maximum send-out capacity from gas storage ≥50% peak-daily demand.
4
C Import ≥70% of their natural gas supply and have  ≥5 pipelines and/or ≥3 LNG ports, a high supplier diversity, and maximum send-out capacity from gas storage <50% of peak-daily demand or  3-4 pipelines and/or 1-2 LNG ports, a medium to high supplier diversity, and maximum gas storage send-out capacity ≥50% peak-daily demand or  ≤4 pipelines or ≤2 LNG ports, low to medium supplier diversity, and maximum send-out capacity ≥100% of peak-daily demand.
D
Import ≥70% of their natural gas supply with 3-5 pipelines and/or 1-2 LNG ports and  medium to high supplier diversity and maximum send-out capacity from gas storage <50% of peak-daily demand or  low to medium supplier diversity and maximum send-out capacity ≥50% of peak-daily demand.
E
Import ≥70% of their natural gas supply and have  3-4 pipelines and/or 1-2 LNG ports with low supplier diversity and maximum send-out capacity <50% of peak-daily demand.
Coal
Security of coal supply is analysed by considering total coal flow without differentiating among different coal qualities. With a few exceptions, different types of coal are substitutable or can be blended, and most boilers can handle different types of coal or coal blends.
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Indicators: coal
The analysis of coal security is based on four indicators related to three dimensions of energy security (Table 21) . • proportion of underground mining Domestic resilience:
• n/a
The most important indicator for coal is import dependency. While not nearly as risky as oil and natural gas, imported coal is still considered riskier than domestically produced coal. Political stability of suppliers is not taken into account because there is no historical evidence that this factor disrupts coal exports.
The risk of import dependency is considered in combination with external resilience factors that include the number and type of entry points and the diversity of suppliers. As with crude oil, oil products and natural gas, these factors are seen as counteracting the risk of imports.
MOSES uses the proportion of underground mining as a domestic risk indicator, because underground mining is more exposed to disruptions than above-ground mining. Underground mining faces risks such as gas explosions and cavern collapses, and is more vulnerable to workers' strikes, since underground miners are more skilled and harder to replace than above-ground miners. In addition, production from open-pit mining is easier to expand in the case of a shortage.
The three ranges of values for each indicator of coal supply security are used (Table 22) . 
Assessment process: coal
The first step in assessing security of coal supply involves evaluating the exposure to external risks by sorting countries based on import dependency (Figure 6 ). Low and moderate importdependent countries are assigned to Groups A and B, depending on the proportion of their domestic production that comes from underground mining. Countries with high import dependency are sorted into Groups C, D and E based on their external resilience.
The second step is to evaluate domestic risk based on the proportion of domestic mining that comes from underground mines. Countries where less than 40% of coal comes from underground mines are assigned to Group A. Countries where more than 40% of coal comes from underground mines are assigned to Group B. The third step is to sort countries with high import dependency based on their external resilience capacities (Table 23 ). Countries fall into three categories in terms of entry points: those with a strong importing infrastructure (more than five coal-receiving ports); those with a moderate importing infrastructure (two to four river or marine ports, and up to three land entry points); and one country with only one port and two land entry points. All countries have medium to high diversity of suppliers of coal, except Switzerland and Finland. 
Results: coal
IEA countries fall into five groups according to the security of their coal supply (Table 24) . 
B
Import 30%-60% of coal with  the share of underground mining >40%.
C
Import ≥70% of coal with  medium to high supplier diversity and ≥5 river or sea ports for coal import.
D
Import ≥70% of coal with  medium to high supplier diversity and 3-4 river or sea ports for coal import.
E
Import ≥70% of coal with  low supplier diversity and ≤2 sea or river ports.
1
Biomass and waste
Biomass and waste encompass a large array of energy sources, including industrial and municipal waste; solid biomass (wood, wood wastes, agricultural wastes, etc.); and landfill, sludge and biogases. Liquid biofuels destined for the transportation sector are dealt with separately at the end of the section since they are mostly used for blending into oil products and follow production and transformation routes whose risks differ from those for solid biomass and waste used in power generation, industry and the residential sector.
Indicators: biomass and waste
The analysis for biomass and waste security is based on two indicators (Table 25 ). External resilience is not considered because only solid biomass is imported and such imports are easy to deliver by sea to commercial ports or by land on a special goods train. Biomass and waste generally face little risk of disruption. Wood can be subject to forest fires; agricultural and wood waste can be disrupted by lower production levels or by upstream plants closing. The more the biomass and waste group depends on a single source, however, the more exposed it is to disruption, so the domestic resilience of the group is measured by the diversity of sources (Table 26) . The analysis of biofuels is based on three indicators (Table 27 ) and separates countries into low, medium and high risk or resilience capacity (Table 28) . Import dependency, an external risk indicator for biofuels, is considered independently for biodiesel and bioethanol (just as gasoline, middle distillates and other oil products are evaluated independently). This external risk is measured against the number and nature of entry points as an indicator of external resilience. (The number of entry points is based on data for oil products, as biofuel-specific entry point data were not available.) Domestic risks are evaluated using the volatility of agricultural output as measured by the OECD agricultural output index (OECD 2008) . Since biofuels are primarily produced from agricultural output and increasingly from agricultural wastes, disruptions in agricultural production can disrupt biofuels production. 
Assessment process: biomass and waste
Biomass and waste security does not vary greatly between IEA countries; the range and natural groupings for the two indicators are far smaller than for any other fuel. Import dependency ranges from 0% to 24% (with only three countries importing more than 15%) and the diversity of sources ranges from 0.3 to 1.0. Thus no country has high exposure to external risks. As a result of this homogeneity, countries are grouped into three categories rather than five (Table 32) . In this module, unlike other MOSES modules, the diversity of sources is the most important indicator, rather than import dependency, because no member country imports more than 25% of the energy it derives from these sources (Figure 7 ).
Figure 7
Biomass and waste: steps for assessing security of supply
Assessment process: biofuels
Like oil products, biofuels are evaluated independently for different end-use products (bioethanol and biodiesel). Other biofuels are not evaluated as they account for less than 5% of biofuel demand in IEA countries. The assessment process is similar to that for oil products: step 1 evaluates the security of externally sourced bioethanol and biodiesel (based on import dependence and the nature of entry points); step 2 evaluates the security of domestically produced biofuels based on the volatility of agricultural output; and step 3 evaluates the overall security of both bioethanol and biodiesel by combining the externally and domestically produced flows of both bioethanol and biodiesel (Figure 8 ). 
Vulnerability of externally sourced bioethanol and biodiesel
This step evaluates countries both on their exposure to external disruptions and their external resilience capacity. The rating for external resilience is solely based on infrastructure, since the diversity of suppliers is not available for biofuels. The infrastructure ratings from the oil products module are used to evaluate the external resilience with respect to biofuels imports (Table 29) . The external resilience rating is then combined with the import dependency for both biodiesel and bioethanol to evaluate the overall security of externally sourced biofuels. 
Vulnerability of domestically produced biofuels
This step sorts countries based on the volatility of agricultural output. Countries fall into three groups: those with very low volatility of agricultural production, those with low volatility of agricultural production, and one country with medium volatility of agricultural production. 
Combining external and domestic factors for biodiesel and bioethanol
The final step combines the external and domestic vulnerability factors for an overall evaluation of both biodiesel and bioethanol, separating IEA countries into groups with similar risk and resilience profiles. The range and diversity of indicators is smaller than for other fuels, so we present only four groups for bioethanol (Table 33a ) and three for biodiesel security (Table 33b) . 
Results: biomass and waste
B
High diversity of sources (with concentration <0.3) and low import dependency (16%-24%).
C
Low diversity of sources (with high concentration of sources >0.5 which means at least 75% of their biomass and waste comes from a single source) and low import dependency (16%-24%). Table 33a Bioethanol: summary of findings on security of supply
3
Group
Countries that have: No. of countries A Low or medium import dependency (<70%), combined with ≥5 sea ports and low volatility of agricultural production (<5%).
B 1
High import dependency (>80%) and ≥5 sea ports.
B 2
No import dependency combined with medium volatility of agricultural production (5%-10%).
C
High import dependency (>80%) combined with 1-2 river ports. Table 33b Biodiesel: summary of findings on security of supply
1
Group
B
High import dependency (>80%) combined with ≥2 sea ports or Medium import dependency (40%-70%) combined with 1-2 river ports and low volatility of agricultural production (<5%).
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C High import dependency (>80%) combined with 1-2 river ports. variability in the weather. In terms of resilience capacities, a low volatility is assumed to indicate a high resilience capacity of the hydropower system, for instance large hydro reservoirs (stocks) compared with annual production. Thus, this indicator reflects not only weather variability but also the load and storage capacity and is considered both a risk and resilience indicator.
In an ideal evaluation, additional risks and resilience capacities would be measured. For risks, an ideal indicator would be drought frequency, severity and duration. For resilience, spare capacity, water storage reservoirs and the geographic spread of hydro power plants could be used. However, comparable data are not available for all IEA countries for these ideal indicators.
Annual volatility of hydropower production for all IEA countries varies from 4% to 30%. The six IEA countries with the largest proportion of TPES from hydropower have the lowest observed annual volatility of production (all ≤11%), probably because they have the best systems for managing variations of hydropower availability. 
Results: hydropower
B
Volatility of hydropower production 12%-21%.
C
Volatility of hydropower production ≥22%.
4
Other non-combustible electricity-producing renewables In addition to hydropower there are three other variable non-combustible sources (wind, solar, and ocean energy) and geothermal energy. Geothermal energy is considered to be most secure because its supply is less variable over the short term. At this stage, IEA countries are not differentiated according to the security of their geothermal energy supply.
The other non-combustible renewables are not dealt with quantitatively in this version of MOSES. Intermittency of wind and solar energy constitutes an inherent part of electricity security, whereas this version of MOSES is focused on security of supply.
The IEA is actively researching electricity security and intermittent resources. A recent IEA publication discusses in detail the technological, geographical, institutional and market factors affecting variable renewable deployment and integration in grids (Harnessing Variable Renewables, IEA 2011) . The study concludes that reliable penetration (and consequent high security) of variable renewable power sources depends on the flexibility of the whole electric system they are embedded in.
Nuclear power
In evaluating the security of nuclear energy supply, MOSES assesses the likelihood of disruption in the supply of electricity produced from nuclear power plants. This assessment is the first step in a comprehensive evaluation of the security of nuclear energy supply; later steps will integrate this evaluation into an assessment of electricity security. It is important to note that the evaluation does not assess the safety of nuclear power plants.
Neither the supply security of the primary source (uranium) nor the supply security of secondary fuels (nuclear fuel) is relevant to an evaluation of short-term energy security. When refuelled, nuclear power plants typically receive two to three years of nuclear fuel stocks and some plants can stockpile up to ten years of nuclear fuel. This resilience, which is unique to nuclear energy, is a major advantage for the energy security of countries that have nuclear power plants.
Indicators: nuclear power
The analysis is based on four indicators that relate to two dimensions of energy security (Table 36) . External risks are not considered because, as discussed, they are not relevant to shortterm nuclear energy security. The analysis presented here will be integrated into the analysis of electricity security, which the IEA is currently developing (see Overview). The results presented below are therefore not representative of the security of overall electricity supply. The nuclear energy indicators and assessment process may also be reviewed to ensure the consistency of the analysis between electricity generation technologies. The most important indicator is the unplanned outage rate. This indicator is reported by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and is the measurement of unplanned energy losses for a given period divided by the reference energy generation for that period. It measures the proportion of unplanned time that a nuclear power plant is offline. For this indicator, the average value for the period 1999-2009 is used.
The second risk indicator is the average age of nuclear power plants. As nuclear power plants age, the likelihood that they will experience an outage increases. This has been signalled as an energy security concern in several member countries. This is a judgement not of the safety of these plants, but of the likelihood they will be available for energy production.
To measure resilience, the diversity of reactor models and the number of nuclear power reactors are used as indicators. The first indicator is calculated using the total generation capacity of each type of reactor model from IAEA data with a Herfindahl-Hirschman index. The fewer models a reactor fleet has, the more vulnerable it is to a systematic design flaw. In France this is known as the "risque générique", which is the risk that the discovery of a technical flaw in one reactor would lead to shutdown of the entire fleet or a large portion of it. The second resilience indicator, the number of nuclear power plants, measures how concentrated the fleet is and how exposed it is to malfunction or shutdown (e.g. because of extreme natural events or accidents) of a single reactor.
Each indicator is broken into different ranges for low, medium and high risk or resilience capacity (Table 37 ).
